We generalize extant health capital models to provide an economic explanation for why individuals invest in health when survival and/or longevity prospects are poor. We allow relative health to impact utility and model depreciation as an amount rather than a rate. As a result, the decline in health causes an inevitable disequilibrium between an increasing marginal benefit from health and a declining cost of health capital that individuals can only resolve with increasing investment in medical care. A central implication is that individuals will demand more medical care the greater their decline in health at any level of health. We develop additional testable hypotheses about what drives medical care spending.
their longevity.
3 Given these observations, perhaps the question should be reframed as "Why do we give up steak and martinis to live to 99 and trade so much wealth for so little health?" From a biological perspective it makes sense that the elderly and infirm would spend more on medical care. However, from an economic perspective, large investments with a low probability of return seem counterintuitive.
There is a substantive literature that focuses on health investment from a human capital perspective. Becker, Murphy and Philipson (2007) argue that "existing estimates of the value of a life year do not apply to the valuation at the end of life." 4 Murphy & Topel (2006) suggest that the higher the probability for survival the greater the willingness to pay for additional longevity, 5 which is inconsistent with high spending among those with low survival prospects. Grossman (1972) , the seminal model of individual health demand, concludes that: "biological factors associated with aging raise the price of health capital and cause individuals to substitute away from future health until death is chosen," which is also inconsistent with increasing investment at the end of life. 6 Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) suggest that an increasing value of life extension partially explains increasing medical care expenditures at the end of life. 7 However, both
Grossman's and Ehrlich & Chuma's results depend on a specific functional form for health decline.
Moreover, the need-based explanation for medical care demand cannot explain the significant differences in demand among individuals with similar medical needs. 8 There are societal good whereby family and society may contribute to end-of-life medical care demand. 10 It is likely that all of these play some role in driving high medical care spending.
This paper offers an alternative economic explanation of high spenders' consumption pattern and provides a foundation for empirical tests of the multiple determinants of medical care
demand. Section II specifies the model and associated assumptions. Section III presents the results of the dynamic optimization and compares our results with Grossman's and Ehrlich and
Chuma's results. Section IV concludes with implications for empirical testing of the model.
II. Model Specification
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We generalize extant Grossman (1972) type models by relaxing certain maintained assumptions in the literature. 12 The assumptions associated with the utility function, health transition, wealth transition and endpoint conditions of our model will be discussed in turn.
A. The Utility Function
An individual's lifetime utility (LU) is defined to be the discounted utility from consumption, ( ) 0 Z t  , the state of health, 
LU e U Z t H t t dt 
This specification generalizes Grossman's by including the state of health rather than a specific flow of healthy days in the utility function. The willingness-to-pay literature provides support for this more general specification reflecting a quality of life component to utility. Berger et. al. (1987) suggest that: 10 The 2005 case of Terri Schivo is an extreme example of demand by social institutions rather than by individual choice. Also see Bonin et. al., (2002) for an extension of the Grossman model to incorporate strategic interactions among family members. Becker et.al. (2007) refer to such socially induced demand as "altruism." 11 Appendix A summarizes nomenclature for the paper. 12 Grossman (2000) includes a review of theoretical extensions of his 1972 model. All of these models maintain the basic elements of Grossman's utility and health transition equations that we generalize in this paper. 13 The stated model does not include a bequest function. Adding a bequest function increases the shadow value of wealth along the planning horizon and thereby decreases the marginal value of health capital resulting in a lower level of demand for health. However, neither the dynamics of the change in demand for health associated with declining health nor the interactions between the time paths of medical care and consumption are changed by adding a bequest function. Derivations including a bequest function are available from the authors.
…when investigating how workers and consumers make choices regarding risks to health, it is important to recognize that the utility individuals derive from consumption depends on their state of health.
14 In other words, health is relevant not only because it provides time for productive activity, but also because it enhances the utility from consumption. Murphy and Topel (2006) specify a quality of life component in their utility function. However, they restrict the state of health to be multiplicatively separable from the other determinants of utility. As a result, the quality of life component cancels out of the ratios of marginal benefits and plays no role in the value of life.
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In addition, the multiplicative specification imposes the assumption that health and consumption are compliments in utility and that health itself cannot be a pure consumption good. We generalize the model to preserve the ability to empirically test the role of quality of life in the value of health and the relationship between health and consumption.
We extend Grossman's model by including the change in health, ( ) t  , in the utility function. The intuition is that the utility associated with health is relative rather than absolute.
For example, an individual with say health = 100 will get a different amount of utility from the same level of health if her change in health is positive (negative); if she is relatively healthier (sicker) than before. In other words, the choice of medical care and consumption is conditional not only on the state of health, but also on the change in the state of health.
Including the change in health in the utility function follows the significant literature in economics on habit formation and social status. 16 More specifically, in the health economics literature this follows Groot (2000) and Gjerde et. al. (2005) who model the frequently observed phenomenon that "chronically ill patients generally report levels of quality of life that are much higher than one would expect given their condition." 17 Gjerde et al. suggest that "the change in health rather than the absolute health matters." 18 Our specification preserves a role for the level of health independent of the change in health and does not impose a specific functional form on 14 Berger et. al, (2004) Constantinides (1990) offers a short survey of the habit formation literature. 17 Groot (2000) p. 403. 18 Gjerde et al (2005) p. 1284. Gjerde et al put a specific adaptation function, K(t), into the utility function. K(t) is a function of H(t); however, they do not reflect the marginal utility of health in their necessary conditions (See Appendix A equation A(2) and A(3)). As a result, they conclude that the co-state on health can be negative. This leads to a counterintuitive conclusion that if individuals can adapt to changing health then they will demand less health to avoid future declines in health: "A person who is able to adapt to a lower health level, would presumably try to avoid a high H (level of health) in an early stage of life that would give high cost in terms of a large fall in H in later periods." p. 1289, emphasis added. an individual's adaptive process. The specification is general in that it allows asymmetry in the utility from improving and declining health.
The more interesting case is when health declines since a substantial proportion of high spenders are in advanced ages and/or poor health. Therefore, we consider the change in health to be negative, ( ) 0 t   , in most of the discussion. In this context, it is not the direction of the health change (positive or negative), but the magnitude (small or large) that is relevant to utility. ; ; Figure 1 derivative of utility with respect to health and the change in health is a movement along the concave utility curve with respect to health as depicted in Figure 1 . 20 An increase (decrease) in health decreases (increases) the marginal utility of health. The same holds for a change in health that is negative but small compared to a change that is more negative. Viewed from the opposite perspective, the change in marginal utility from a change in health is hypothesized to be lower (greater) at higher (lower) levels of health. Intuitively, you are better able to withstand a larger change of health at higher levels of health than you are at lower levels of health when you are already on the steeper part of the utility curve.
B. Health Transition Function
The change in health is a function, , of time, t, medical care, ( ) 
This general specification for health transition is consistent with current accounting for intangible assets. The specific functional form for health transition used by Grossman and most others follows the traditional accounting identity for all depreciating assets. In Grossman the change in the stock of health is the difference between investment, I(t) and the rate of depreciation multiplied by the existing stock: ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued statement #142 changing the accounting for intangible assets: intangible assets are no longer amortized (at constant or varying rates); rather, they are tested periodically for impairment and written down accordingly. In justifying the change, the Statement noted "financial statement users…indicated that they did not regard 20 The alternative assumption of a positive cross-partial, U  H  0 , would require the shape of the utility of health curve to change with a change in health. Specifically, it would require the utility of health curve to become steeper with an improvement in health, and more flat with a decline in health. This would suggest that individuals become more indifferent to different levels of health as health declines. 21 Depreciation can also be considered a negative value, in which case it would be more negative over time 0    . This would make no difference to the sign of the time path of medical care or any other results. 22 Prior versions of the model specified a depreciation function that is endogenous with the choice of medical care and/or the state of health. This merely added component(s) to the marginal benefit from medical care, but did not fundamentally alter the conclusions. goodwill amortization expense as being useful information in analyzing investments," and the change "…will better reflect the underlying economics of those assets." 23 Similarly, we will
show that adding back a rate of depreciation to the cost of health capital distorts the analysis of the investment in health.
Beyond accounting consistency, Grossman's specific functional form for health transition may not accurately reflect the time path of health decline. When a rate of depreciation is multiplied by the existing stock of health the amount of health decline decreases at the end of the lifecycle even if the rate of depreciation increases. This is depicted in Figure 2 panel A, which
shows the time path of health declining asymptotically. Panel B shows that with multiplicative depreciation the largest amount of health decline will occur prior to the end of life. Changing the rate of depreciation will change the slope of this curve, but not its basic shape. . In other words, the Grossman model suggests that the higher the state of health, the larger the negative change in health at any given rate of depreciation. This implies an asymptotic decline of health at the end of life and not the steep decline suggested by the longevity data.
Whether H H  (which in our general specification is equivalent to H  ) is positive or negative is an empirical question. Moreover, generalizing the health transition function allows for two hypotheses consistent with a positive relationship between health and the change in health. First, an individual in a higher state of health may be better able to recover from an exogenous health shock without any medical care. In other words, a healthy body is better able to "heal thyself." 25 More importantly, the general specification allows health to be an element in the health production function. The implication is that the state of health is relevant to the productivity of medical care, or in medical terms, co-morbidities hurt the prognosis for recovery.
For example, if an individual needs open heart surgery, she is more likely to recover fully and 24 See Nuland (1993) : "Though biomedical science has vastly increased mankind's average life expectancy, the maximum has not changed in verifiable recorded history. In developed countries only one in ten thousand people lives beyond the age of one hundred" p. 85. 25 This is also consistent with the amount of depreciation modeled as a declining function of health. This was done in Liljas (1998.) The result is consistent with ours in that a negative term associated with the marginal change in health associated with the state of health is subtracted from the user cost of health capital (see p. 158.) However, in Liljas the rate of depreciation is still added to this cost.
improve her state of health if she does not also suffer from diabetes, does not smoke and has a history of good diet and exercise. Mathematically this is reflected in the sign of the cross partial of health transition: 0 26 This extends the Grossman model in which health production is independent of the state of health:
( ); ( ) I t I M t TH t E t
 investment is a function of medical care, time spent producing health, and the stock of education representing non-health human capital.
We assume weak diminishing returns to the change in health from both medical care and the state of health:
and diminishing returns to scale for the joint production process.
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Finally, we assume 0 mt   , reflecting the advancement of medical technology over time.
For example, heart by-pass surgery is more effective in restoring health today than it was 20 years ago because of the smaller incisions necessary and advances in anesthesia, by-pass blood filtering and recovery procedures just to name a few improvements. Moreover, advances in medical technology have made more aggressive surgery viable for older patients. 28 However, in the future drug-resistant bacteria or other pandemics may call this assumption into question. In any case, the more general specification allows for empirical testing of this critical relationship of the benefits of medical care over time to medical care demand.
The proposed changes to the health transition function should be considered critically.
The willingness-to-pay literature critiques the human capital literature in part because of the sensitivity of the results to the specification of the health production function. Berger (1987) argues that, "the fundamental problem with the health production function approach is that it is hard to identify and measure all of the inputs that affect health." 29 Harrington and Portney (1987) , Atkinson and Crocker (1992) , and Mullahy and Portney (1990) document problems with 26 Our assumption of a positive cross-partial does not further assume that this relationship is constant along the continuum of health states. At very low and very high levels of health the impact of medical care may be lower because there is little medical care can do to improve health. 27 Grossman assumes diminishing returns to scale for medical care with the amount of time invested held constant, but constant returns to scale for the joint production process with medical care and time. Note that in Grossman time is an element of the joint household production of medical care and does not indicate technical change over time, which is held constant by assumption. Ehrlich & Chuma assume diminishing returns to scale for medical care, both independently and jointly with production time. See Ehrlich and Chuma's (1990, p. 768 omitted variables, measurement error, and endogeneity bias respectively. The different implications we derive from the resulting equilibrium demand for health and time path of medical care demand support the willingness-to-pay critique. The changes are made with the argument that they are more intuitively reasonable than the assumptions underlying the existing human capital models, but their validity must certainly be checked empirically with care taken to address econometric estimation issues.
C. Wealth transition function
The changes to the wealth transition function are minor generalizations consistent with extant human capital literature. The wealth transition function is a constant rate of interest, r, times accumulated wealth, R, plus income,   ( ) w H t , as a function of the state of health, minus the cost of medical care, ( ) ( ) P t m t , and the cost of consumption, Z, with price normalized to one:
The wage function is more generally a function of the state of health rather than healthy days and can include non-labor income from disability and/or social insurance payments. This assumption allows for the state of health to affect the wage rate as well as the amount of time available for work. It also reflects the modern blurring of boundaries between work and non-work time:
individuals often work when they are sick, and spend time procuring medical care when they are at work. We assume that 0; 0 H HH w w   reflecting diminishing returns to health with respect to income.
D. Endpoint conditions
The endpoint conditions are as follows:
The model assumes a nonnegative initial endowment of health and wealth. The terminal health state, H min , the level of health at which life can no longer be sustained, is an exogenously given constant. In other words, the model does not allow medical technology to lower the level of H min over the course of the planning horizon. Similarly, the maximum biological lifespan, T max , is exogenously fixed. The actual terminal time, T, is determined endogenously by the transversality condition, discussed in the next section. Finally, the terminal wealth, ( ) R T , must be nonnegative, eliminating the possibility of debt at the time of death. However, debt is not precluded for ( , ) t t T  .
III. Results
A. Necessary Conditions
Based on the specification of the model in Section II, our problem is to find the piecewise continuous control functions ( ) Z t and ( ) m t , the terminal time T, and associated piecewise differentiable state functions ( )
to (2), (3), and (4). The Hamiltonian function is defined by 
t H t t t m t H t t rR t w H t P t m t Z t
except at points of discontinuity of
and 30 The superscripts on  denote the multiplier for health, H, and wealth, R, respectively. There is also a multiplier on the objective function, but it is trivial to show that it is equal to one for this problem.
The terminal condition 
For notational ease, we drop the * notation below; all that follows is based on the simultaneous solution of these necessary conditions for the optimal values for the controls, terminal time, and states as indicated above.
B. Equilibrium Demand for Health
The equilibrium demand for health offers a different explanation for why individuals may demand more medical care when health declines than that suggested by the equilibrium condition from the Grossman model. The equilibrium condition is:
The corresponding continuous time equilibrium condition from Grossman is:
is the ratio of the shadow prices of health and wealth: 31 Appendix B provides a detailed derivation. 32 Grossman (1972) , Appendix A equation (A13), p. 250.
The critical difference between the two specifications appears in the marginal cost of health capital. In the Grossman model the rate of depreciation is added back to the user cost of capital consistent with traditional accounting. Thus, as the rate of depreciation increases, the user cost of health capital increases. To maintain equilibrium, individuals decrease their demand for health in order to increase the left-hand-side marginal benefits from health. This is the mathematical foundation for Grossman's conclusion that as health depreciates an individual continues to reduce his demand for health until "death is chosen." An individual will simultaneously demand less health and more medical care only if the amount of depreciation increases the marginal benefits from health more than the rate of depreciation increases the marginal costs. In this case, an individual would demand more medical care to increase health and bring down the marginal benefits to be in line with the marginal costs. 33 However, the multiplicative form for health transition makes any significant increase in medical spending unlikely. If a high rate of depreciation occurs when health is already at a low level (as would occur at advanced ages) the resulting amount of health decline will be small, but the change in marginal benefits will still be large because the individual will already be on the steeper part of the concave benefit curve. If a high rate of depreciation strikes when health is still at a high level (at younger ages) then the amount of depreciation would be high and also push the individual to the steeper part of the benefit curve. Either way, in the Grossman model the change in marginal benefits is likely to be commensurate with the change in marginal costs requiring little investment in additional health to maintain equilibrium. Moreover, if we assume a maximum biological lifespan the potential marginal benefits in terms of additional years of longevity decreases as we age. Thus, it is even less likely that we would see significant spending on medical care at advanced ages.
By contrast, the more general specification for health transition results in the marginal productivity of health, H  , decreasing the marginal cost of health capital. As depreciation reduces the stock of health, the marginal productivity of health increases, which decreases the user cost of health capital. At the same time, the decline in health increases the marginal benefits from health. Disequilibrium is inevitable. The only way an individual can regain equilibrium is 33 In the Grossman model the marginal cost of health capital does not change as a result of increased investment in health because of the assumption of constant returns to scale for health investment. The proportion of medical care to time in health investment does not change because neither the price of medical care nor the wage rate are functions of health or the quantity of medical care.
to invest in medical care. Investing in medical care does two things. First, investment increases the stock of health, which decreases the marginal benefits from health. Second, investing in medical care increases g(t), the marginal cost of health capital, due to the assumption of declining productivity of medical care. 34 Moreover, following the assumption 0 mH   , at lower levels of health medical care is less efficient in producing more health, so even more spending on medical care is needed to drive down marginal benefits. Thus, as health declines an individual may want a full recovery, but increasing marginal costs force him to settle for less health and ultimately a finite life. In this way, the model is consistent with both neoclassical economic theory and the observed increase in medical care spending in old and/or sick states.
The impact of the assumption of diminishing returns to medical care is not obvious from inspecting the equilibrium condition because it is embedded in g(t). In Ehrlich and Chuma's model g(t) exactly equals the marginal cost of health investment. In our specification, deriving g(t) from the necessary condition (8) yields:
Where the last equality substitutes for the costate on wealth from the necessary condition (9).
The first term on the right-hand-side is consistent with Ehrlich and Chuma's assumption of increasing marginal cost of investment: as the quantity of medical care increases the marginal productivity of medical care decreases increasing the marginal price. The second term is the discounted dollar value of marginal utility with respect to health change. This value is subtracted from the marginal price decreasing the over-all marginal cost of health capital. The more negative the change in health, the higher the marginal utility and the lower the marginal cost of health capital. This suggests that individuals are forward looking in their valuation of health capital and implies that in equilibrium the demand for health is higher in our specification than in Ehrlich and Chuma's.
Taking the derivative of g(t) with respect to medical care yields the following: 34 Grossman assumes a constant returns to scale health production function and investment at constant equilibrium proportions of medical care and time (see equation (11) p. 228) so additional investment in health does not change the marginal cost of gross investment.
The first term is positive because of the assumption of diminishing returns to medical care, 0 mm   , and the preceding negative sign. The second term is also positive due to the preceding negative sign and the concavity of the utility function in α. The sign of the third term depends on the sign of Z U  , which is an empirical issue. Nonetheless, an increase in medical care increases the marginal cost of health investment for at least two reasons: the marginal price of medical care increases, and the second-order impact on marginal utility decreases.
Finally, ( ) g t  , the percent change in the marginal cost of health investment, can contribute either positively or negatively to the marginal cost of health capital.
The sign of ( ) g t  depends on the relative magnitudes of the co-states of health and wealth, which in turn depend on the endowed level of health and wealth and the relative rates of change. A higher level of health decreases the rate of change of the health co-state (see necessary condition (6)). Thus, increasing medical care to increase the state of health is more likely to result in a capital loss on health capital and a further increase to the user cost of health capital. This contributes to an individual ultimately settling for less health and a finite life.
C. The Value of Longevity and the Quality of Life
Contrasting the value of g(t) with that derived in Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) shows that an increasing value of longevity supports increasing medical care spending at the end of life only if we assume the specific functional form for health transition that adds back a rate of depreciation to the cost of health capital. The more general functional form suggests both the value of longevity and the value of a healthy life fall at the end of life. The relative values of these two components of the value of health capital are indeterminate in both models; but the likelihood that quality of life is more valuable than quantity of life is greater in the more general specification because the quality of life value gets compounded rather than discounted as health declines.
The time path and general solution for g(t) can be derived from the equilibrium demand for health equation (15): 
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The corresponding equations in Ehrlich and Chuma are: 
U u g t g T e w u e du
Ehrlich and Chuma suggest that the first term of g(t) represents "the value of life extension" while the second is the "value of healthy life." 36 As with the equilibrium demand for health, the critical difference between the two specifications is that the more general form for health transition subtracts the marginal productivity of health instead of adds back the rate of depreciation. The key implications are that the value of longevity no longer increases unambiguously over the lifecycle and the value of a healthy life is compounded rather than discounted at advanced ages.
Ehrlich and Chuma conclude that the value of life extension continuously rises with age because g(T) gets discounted at an increasingly lower rate as t approaches T. This is unambiguous because the integral in the exponent is positive for all [ , ] 
. When the rate of depreciation is replaced by H   from the more general specification the sign of the integral is not necessarily positive. At some point as t approaches T H  may equal r and exceed it for some time thereafter. If the integral in the exponent turns negative, the terminal value of health capital, g(T) will be compounded rather than discounted due to the preceding negative sign. This suggests that the value of life extension would be discounted at a decreasing rate up to the point where the integral would equal zero and then be compounded at an increasing, and then ultimately a decreasing rate as the terminal time approaches and g(t) must inevitably equal g(T).
Intuitively, this picture suggests that when we are young we discount the value of extending our life. At some point (perhaps a mid-life crisis) we start to value life extension more; but ultimately we can only extend life so much so the value of life extension falls to just equal the 35 These are equations (17) and (18) respectively in Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) 
. This is more likely at later ages for two reasons. First, health is lower so H r   is more plausible. Second, the integral from t to u is larger allowing the times when H r   to outweigh the earlier years when it is more likely that H r   . Thus, the higher bracketed quality of life value experienced when old and sick contributes more to the integrated value of a healthy life. This potential for compounding makes the total value of a healthy life greater in the general specification than with the more specific functional form for health transition.
The relative values of longevity and quality of life, particularly at the end of life, are indeterminate in both specifications. The time path ( ) 0 g t   declines at a faster rate in the general specification; but g(t) is likely to be higher because the quality of a healthy life is greater and the value of terminal health capital, g(T) reaches its peak prior to the end of life. Whether the value of longevity is greater than the value of a healthy life at any time, particularly towards the end of life, depends on the value of terminal health capital, g(T), and the rate of change in the integrated value of a healthy life, which in turn depend on all of the model parameters as the time paths of the co-states, states and controls are determined simultaneously with the terminal time,
T. Nonetheless, if we consider the time right before death, T  , the integral values of both terms would be the same and we can make some predictions about relative values. In our specification:
And in Ehrlich and Chuma:
Where the right hand side is the expression for the marginal cost of health investment. be defined. The Ehrlich and Chuma specification requires I(T)>0 for g(T) to be >0. 37 In both models the relative value of quality of life declines with more spending and increases with the shadow price of wealth. 38 Adding the change of health to utility suggests that the more negative the health decline the greater the relative value of quality of life over longevity. Larger health declines result in larger marginal utilities which both increase the marginal benefits from health and decrease the marginal costs.
D. Time path of medical care.
The time derivative of the necessary condition (8) solved for m  yields the time path for medical care demand. 39 The signs above each term are either by assumption as discussed in section II, as required by the sufficiency conditions, or discussed below.
37 Eisenring (1999) explores the trade-off between longevity and quality of life for a discrete-time pure investment specification of the Grossman model. To solve the model using dynamic programming he assumes zero investment at time T. This strategy would not be applicable to Ehrlich and Chuma's continuous-time specification. 38 Since a bequest function would increase  R (T ) it would increase the relative importance of quality of life over longevity. 39 Appendix B provides a detailed derivation.
D must be positive to satisfy the sufficiency conditions, which is consistent with the concavity of the utility and health production functions.
The co-state variables H  and R  are nonnegative. The co-state with respect to health is positive from the sufficiency conditions 41 and the co-state with respect to wealth is nonnegative from the solution to the differential equation (7) 42 and the transversality condition associated
In the context of the time path of medical care demand we interpreted the first term which aggregates the second-derivatives of utility with respect to the change in health as the "quality of life." Notably, the quality of life is associated with the change in health, , rather than the state 40 Grossman (1972), p. 223. 41 This is so because the health transition function, , is concave in both the state and control variables. See Caputo (2005) , Corollary 3.1, p. 55. 42 The explicit solution for  R (t) from the necessary condition (7) this is a result of the Pontryagin maximum principal that requires
: the shadow price of health depreciates at the rate of its marginal contribution to the value function. 44 When a stock is physically used up in the creation of value (e.g. mining a stock of minerals in the ground and selling them) such depreciation is obvious. However, health is not necessarily "used" in the process of deriving value from it. In this case, health depreciation is independent of value creation. Nonetheless, the value of the stock of health still declines in proportion to the benefits derived. In other words, each unit of additional health created by medical care is worth less by the sum of the marginal benefits including both the marginal utility from the state of health and the change in health as well as the marginal changes in health and wealth with respect to health, H  and H w . Thus, the optimal choice of medical care at any point in time needs to account for the change in the value caused by the change in the stock of health associated with the choice:
the additional health decreases the shadow price of even more additional health which reasonably is associated with a decline in the demand for medical care.
The other positive contribution to the time path for medical care demand is the mt  term in the third line. This cross-partial derivative of health production with respect to time and medical care can represent what Becker et. al (2007) refer to as "hope." In their words, it is "the current consumption of future survival" associated with the marginal additional health produced 43 Counterintuitive in that one might think the higher the marginal benefits from health the higher the demand for medical care. Higher marginal benefits from health would be associated with higher medical care demand at all times, but not necessarily with an increasing demand over time. 44 See Dorfman (1969) decrease with time (due to discounting and the negative time path for the co-state) the marginal utility of health change will increase when health declines sharply. If sharp declines occur at younger ages this multiplier will be higher, increasing the positive impact of this "hope" term on the time path of medical care demand.
The remaining terms on the third line reflect the inevitability of death. As depreciation increases over time causing health to decline, the effectiveness of medical care declines which is associated with a negative time path of medical care demand. This is consistent with the demand for a finite life suggested by the equilibrium demand for health. An individual will only demand more medical care to the point where the marginal cost equals the marginal benefit, and as health declines an individual will not spend ever increasing amounts on medical care to recoup all lost health.
Finally, the last line represents the traditional downward sloping demand curve of medical care relative to price. If the change in price of medical care over time, P  , exceeds the real rate of interest, which has been the case over the past century, then the demand for medical care will decline. However, the price term is multiplied by the shadow value of wealth which declines over time (see necessary condition (7)). This suggests the testable hypothesis that the impact of a change in price on the demand for medical care decreases over an individual's life.
In other words, the frequently cited price elasticity of medical care demand that was empirically estimated in the RAND Health Insurance Experiment from observing individuals under 63 years old may not be the same as that for older individuals. 46 Since individuals over 65 are disproportionally represented in the top 5% of spenders, their price elasticity is particularly important to evaluate policy aimed to reduce total medical care expenditures. Moreover, as the 45 Becker et. al. (2007) p. 3. 46 The price elasticity estimated from the RAND study was approximately -.2. See Manning et. al (1987) . More accurately, the RAND study estimates insurance-induced changes in price. Remler and Atherly (2003) analyze the RHIE data for differences in price elasticity among different health groups and find no difference but suspect low power due to small sub-samples. A similar analysis of the RHIE data for different age groups would likely have the same problem exacerbated by the truncation of the sample at age 63. Remler and Atherly do find different responsiveness to insurance-induced price changes using the 1995 Current Medicare Beneficiary Survey. However, our time path suggests that these estimates may be confounded by other factors, particularly the change in health, which was not available in their cross-sectional analysis.
change in health becomes more negative, the positive elements of the time path are more likely to outweigh the negative. Thus, the impact of price on the demand for medical care is likely to be less for those with larger declines in their health at any age.
Taken in sum, the time path of medical care demand has more factors associated with declining than increasing demand over time. However, a declining time path for medical care demand would be inconsistent with the observed increase in medical care spending over an individual's lifecycle. The relative magnitude of the positive factors may still result in increasing demand; but without including the change of health in the utility function, the only remaining positive impact would be the "hope" factor. This suggests that if the change in health is not relevant for medical care demand, then the hope factor dominates all others at the end of life. The implications of this time path are also consistent with the demand for medical care being a function not of age directly, but of some other factor that is confounded with age.
Several empirical studies have found that the effect of age on health care expenditures is reduced and even insignificant when controlled for the time to death. 47 If the change in health is relevant, and it is more negative the shorter the time to death, then this may account for these empirical results.
Nonetheless, the time path for medical care demand is consistent with the ambiguous time path of health investment described by Grossman: Murphy and Topel (2006) , then a decline in health would be associated with an increase in consumption, and an increase in medical care would be associated with a decrease in consumption. However, the net effect on consumption would depend on the relative magnitudes of these two opposite effects.
Similarly, if the cross partials are negative, then a decline in health would be associated with a decline in consumption, and an increase in medical care would be associated with an increase in consumption. If the latter dominates, the resulting increase in both consumption and medical 49 In the Grossman model this would be declining returns to medical care holding the time spent on health constant as the total production function is homogenous of degree one. 50 Appendix B contains a detailed derivation. 51 Both cross-partials will have the same sign because the change in marginal utility of consumption will shift in the same direction. For example, a change in health that is marginally less negative (a positive change) nonetheless reduces health, but results in a marginal utility of consumption that is marginally higher (a positive change) than the marginal utility of consumption associated with a more negative change.
care would violate a binding budget constraint at equilibrium without debt or health-related wealth transfers.
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V. Conclusion
The model developed here generalizes extant models of medical care demand and results in some intuitively appealing explanations for why the old and sick demand more. The rationale goes beyond biological need and is consistent with neoclassical economic theory. The central implication of the model is that individuals will demand more medical care when health declines to regain equilibrium with a declining cost of health capital. Moreover, the more an individual's health declines the more medical care she will demand no matter her state of health. This may help to explain the variation in medical care demand among individuals with the same state of health. In addition, the model implies that the value of longevity does not unambiguously increase over the lifecycle and so cannot explain the increase in the demand for medical care at the end of life. Finally, the model suggests that the advancement of medical technology over time increases the demand for medical care, while the affect of price on demand decreases over time. These implications, as well as the critical utility relationship between health and consumption, must be tested empirically. The model indicates that any empirical specification for the demand for medical care should relax the assumption of separability between the demands for medical care and other consumption and allow for intertemporal substitution. 
